Scalability is one of the most important requirements for secure multicast in a multi-group environment. In this study, we propose a decentralized multi-group key management scheme that allows each multicast group sender to control the access to its group communication independently. Scalability is enhanced by local rekeying and inter-working among different subgroups. The group key secrecy and backward/forward secrecy are also guaranteed. key words: stateless member, multi-group communication, decentralized group key management, identity-based encryption
Introduction
In the multi-sender group communications, each member can potentially be both a sender and a receiver. By considering the fact that a multi-group communication consists of many one-to-many communications, some of the previous one-to-many schemes can be used in multi-sender group communications. However, this leads to inefficient use of keys and does not scale well when the number of multicast senders increases [1] .
The polynomial-based multi-group key management scheme is one of the promising solutions to enhance the scalability and achieve the stateless property. Zhang et al. [2] proposed a polynomial-based multi-service group key management scheme. In this scheme, the group members are managed by each service group and the group keys are delivered to valid group members using the polynomial function constructed with their identifications. When the number of subscribers of a service is N and the number of services is S , the rekeying message size would be O(S N) since the degree of the polynomial function for each service is N + 1.
Scalability can be more enhanced by a decentralized approach. The degree of the polynomial can be reduced by dividing the whole network into smaller subgroups and confining the rekeying into the local subgroup area. In this paper, we propose a decentralized multi-group key management scheme. It allows each group manager to update and distribute its group key to valid group members with the help of the interworking of different subgroup managers in a distributed way. 
System Description
The network is constructed on a decentralized multiplesource based multicast tree network as in Fig. 1 . The root nodes are senders and group managers (GM) of each multicast service. They manage their group keys and sessions independently. Intermediate nodes are subgroup managers that may have local subgroup members. Subgroup managers manage their subgroup membership and subgroup key independently. In addition, they are in charge of coordinating the inter-subgroup communications and delivering the group key update message sent from the sender to the group members attached to themselves. Multicast data transmitted by a sender is delivered to the group members of different subgroups by inter-working of intermediate subgroup managers. A user can join the network through one of the subgroup managers. Let G = {G 1 , G 2 , · · · , G s } denote the set of multicast groups, or multicast services in the network. ∀G i ∈ G, G i maintains independent session I i . Let U = {u 1 , · · · , u n } be the universe of users. Let P = {p 1 , · · · , p m } be the set of subgroup managers, and SG = {S G 1 , S G 2 , · · · , S G m } be the set of subgroups such that ∀p j ∈ P, p j is a subgroup manager of S G j . Let s j denote the sender of G j ∈ G, and R j ⊆ U denote the set of users who can access the group communication transmitted from s j . Let ID t be the public identification of a user u t . Let L j l = {ID t |u t ∈ R j , u t ∈ S G l }, which is the membership list maintained by p l .
The other notations related to the secret keys are defined in Table 1 . 
Multi-Sender Group Key Management
In this section, a decentralized multi-group key management scheme is proposed. The basic mechanism of the key update can be described as the local subgroup key update followed by the group key delivery to the valid group members. The key update message is encrypted and converted along the multicast path using the identity-based encryption in a distributed way. Each member can decrypt the rekeying message with its subgroup key and path key. Let G 1 and G 2 be the additive and multiplicative groups of order q for some large prime q, respectively. A map e :
ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and all a, b ∈ Z * q . Our identitybased encryption system can be built from any bilinear map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 between two groups G 1 , G 2 as long as a variant of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in G 1 is hard. In this paper, it is assumed that s ∈ Z * q is the master secret key, sP is the master public key, ID ∈ G 1 , and k ∈ Z * q . Additionally, every user u t has sID t as its secret key.
Key Setup
The proposed key distribution protocol is defined as three algorithms: subgroup key, path key, and group key distribution.
Path Key Distribution
Path key is distributed from the sender to the valid group member in a contributory way when the member joins the multicast group. The path key is the aggregated key of the sender and subgroup managers on the path from the sender to the group member in the multicast tree. When there are p 1 , · · · , p m subgroup managers between the sender s 0 to the user u t ∈ R 0 in S G m , the path key PK 0 t is constructed and delivered to the user u t as follows.
1. s 0 selects a random r 0 ∈ Z q , computes U 0 , V 0 = r 0 P, k 0 + G(ê(r 0 ID t , sP)) , and sends it to p 1 . (r i ID t , sP) ) and sends it to child subgroups in the multicast tree until it reaches to u t . 
Subgroup Key Distribution
The subgroup key is delivered to the only local subgroup members using the polynomial function like [2] . When a subgroup manager in S G l distributes its subgroup key S K j l to the subgroup members who subscribed to G j , the distribution process performed by p l progresses as follows. (rID i , sP) ).
Selects random r, R ∈
Z q and δ ∈ G 1 . 2. ∀ID i ∈ L j l , computes x i = G(ê
Constructs the polynomial function
f j (x) = m i=1 (x − x i ) = m i=0 a i x i mod q, where m = |L j l |.
Constructs the exponential functions
When a user u t ∈ R j in S G l receives the rekeying message, it can decrypt the subgroup key as follows.
Computes x t = G(ê(rP, sID t )). 2. Computes δ + RC
For a user u s S G l ∩ R j , it cannot decrypt the rekeying message since m i=0 a i x i s 0. Even if a stateless member in S G l could not receive the rekeying message while it was off-line, it can decrypt the subgroup key at any time whenever it receives the rekeying message again as long as it is a legitimate group member.
Group Key Distribution
Group key is updated and distributed to the group members on a member leave in the group. Each group key is managed by each multicast sender independently. When s 0 sends the GK i 0 to its group members at session i(= I 0 ), and p 1 , · · · , p m are located on the path between the sender and group members in S G m , the group key distribution protocol progresses as follows.
1. s 0 selects random r ∈ Z q and σ ∈ G 2 . Then, s 0 com-
and sends it to p 1 . 
Key Update
A user joins the group by sending a join request to the closest subgroup first. Then, its subgroup manager forwards the join request to the sender along the path of the multicast tree. If the sender authenticates the joining member, the session changes and the group key is updated for backward secrecy. When a member leaves the multicast groups, group keys of the groups are also updated and delivered to the valid group members for forward secrecy.
Member Join
The rekeying mechanism in a member-join event can be described as a path key delivery followed by the subgroup key and group key update. When a member u t joins a multicast group G j through a S G l at session i(= I j ), the key update procedure progresses as follows:
A path key PK j t is constructed and delivered to u t using the path key distribution algorithm as described in Sect. 3.1.1. 
Member Leave
The rekeying mechanism in a member-leave event can be described as a local rekeying of the subgroup key followed by a new group key distribution. When a member u t in a subgroup S G l leaves the multicast service G j at session i(= I j ), the algorithm to update the group key progresses as follows: and sends it to the group members following the multicast tree network using the group key distribution algorithm described in 3.1.3. For simple and fair comparison, it is assumed that all users in the network are service subscribers to all S services. Thus, the size of each multicast group is N.
Analysis

Performance Analysis
The proposed scheme reduces the degree of the polynomial by decentralized local rekeying and interworking among different subgroups using the identity-based encryption. Thus, the rekeying cost and storage overhead can be reduced at the small expense of computation cost at the subgroup managers.
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze that the proposed key manage- ment scheme guarantees the backward secrecy in a memberjoin event, and forward secrecy in a member-leave event. In addition, the proposed group key distribution protocol using the identity-based encryption is proved to be secure against the outside p.p.t. adversary.
